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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cipal case, specific details should not be used to the exclusion of general
terms. General terms such as "out houses," "yard," and "garden" are
common and have proved effective. 16
JAMES W. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
Taxation-Barred Claims-Equitable Recoupment
Plaintiff, as administratrix, paid estate tax on her deceased hus-
band's estate. After the period of limitations on claim for refund of
the estate tax had expired, the Commissioner assessed against the estate
a deficiency assessment for income taxes and penalties. The plaintiff
paid same and sought a refund of estate tax to accord with the resultant
decrease of the taxable estate, but was denied recovery in the district
court' because of a three year statute of limitations on refund of estate
tax.2 The plaintiff then brought suit for refund of income tax, seeking
to recoup the estate tax overpayments against the income tax deficiency
assessments, a refund of which the statute of limitations had not yet
barred. The court allowed full recovery with interest.3
The doctrine of recoupment, an equitable remedy of common law
origin, is the act of rebating a part of a claim on which one is sued, by
means of a legal or equitable right resulting from a counterclaim arising
out of the same transaction. 4 In Bull v. United States,5 the first case
in which this remedy was extended to federal taxation, the United
States Supreme Court limited recoupment to situations arising out of
"some feature of the same transaction upon which the plaintiff's claim
is grounded."6 The basic problem in recoupment cases stems from the
difficulty in determining what constitutes the same transaction.
Four times the Supreme Court has considered the matter of recoup-
1" Here follow some examples of descriptions in search warrants that were
held valid:
"a certain dwelling house, barn, garage, outbuildings and sheds located at ... 
People v. Holton, 326 Ill. 481, 158 N.E. 134 (1927); "room, house, outhouse,
yard, garden and appurtenances thereto . . . ." Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87
N.E. 103 (1909); "building and all out buildings commonly known as . .. ."
Thomson v. State, 196 Ind. 229, 147 N.E. 778 (1925); "one story frame house
and all outbuildings appurtenant thereto . . . " Goodman v. State, 201 Ind. 189,
165 N.E. 755 (1929).
1 Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 910, 53 STAT. 138 (now INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,§ 6511).
United States v. Herring, 240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957).
80 C.J.S., Set-Off and Counterclaim § 2 (1953).
295 U.S. 247 (1935). Decedent's estate was substituted in decedent's place
in a partnership and received income therefrom. The Commissioner first incor-
rectly levied estate tax on the sum so received and, after suit for refund of this
tax was barred, he levied income tax on the same sum. The Court allowed the
taxpayer to recoup the barred estate tax overpayment against the income tax de-
ficiency correctly due on the sum.
Old. at 262.
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment in tax cases, twice allowing the remedy-Bull v. United States
and Stone v. White7 -and twice denying it-McEachern v. Rose8
and Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.9 The McEachern case,
decided squarely on the basis of statutory provisions,' 0 presents a situa-
tion similar to that in the Bull case, yet the statutes applied in the former
were never mentioned in the latter opinion, though they were in effect at
the time involved. It is possible to argue that the McEachern and
Electric Storage Battery cases do not present same-transaction situa-
tions such as are found in the Bull and Stone cases.-' Literally this
is true in that in the latter two cases the taxable event was a single
one-the receipt of a sum of money by the taxpayer-while in the other
two cases there was no such receipt of a single fund of money. But to
adopt this criterion is to confine the doctrine of recoupment to an area
well within the boundaries established by the lower courts. Rather, the
McEachern case may be distinguished from the Bull case in that in the
former (1) recoupment was not pleaded, though the courts have held
that, to be applied, it must be pleaded, 12 and (2) the Commissioner did
not introduce into evidence the amount sought to be recouped.' 8 Fur-
thermore, the Court never mentioned the McEachern case in the Electric
Storage Battery decision, which leads one to suspect that the Court
7301 U.S. 532 (1937). Testamentary trustees paid tax on trust income which
should have been paid by the beneficiary. After the statute had run on an action
by the government to collect the tax from the beneficiary, the trustees brought an
action to recover their erroneous tax payment. The Court allowed the government
to recoup the barred amount due from the beneficiary against the refund of the
erreoneous payment by the trustees.
8 302 U.S. 56 (1937). Decedent sold a block of stock and agreed to be paid in
equal yearly payments. The administrator, plaintiff in this action, erroneously
reported as income of the estate each installment in the year received, instead of
cumulating the remaining installments and reporting them as estate assets. After
the statute of limitations had run on the year in which the estate tax was paid, the
plaintiff brought this action to recover the income tax paid as a result of reporting
the installments as yearly income. The Court refused to allow the government to
recoup the barred estate tax deficiency of the earlier year against the refund of in-
come tax paid in the later years.
9 329 U.S. 296 (1946). Plaintiff paid excise tax which was not due under the
statute although assessed by the Commissioner. Subsequently the Commissioner
realized that the tax was illegal and refunded the amounts paid in years not yet
barred. Plaintiff owed income tax on this refund but sought to recoup the amount
of barred excise tax overpayments against the income tax deficiency. The Court
denied recoupment.
"0 If a tax may not be refunded or collected because barred by statutes of
limitations, a credit or debit therefor may not be made by the Commissioner.
Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 607-609, 45 STAT. 874, 875 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 6401(a), 6514(a), (b)). "These provisions preclude the government
from taking any benefit from the taxpayer's overpayment by crediting it against
an unpaid tax whose collection has been barred by limitation." 302 U.S. at 60.
11329 U.S. at 299-300.
"Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955); First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 647 (W.D.S.C. 1954); cf. Bull. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 247, 263 (1935).
" McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment in Federal Taxation, 28 VA. L.
Rrv. 577, 594 (1942).
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may not regard McEachern as limiting the scope of recoupment. More-
over, in the Eletcric Storage Battery case, the Court expressly stated
that its intention was to narrow the scope of the recoupment doctrine in
the tax field, and it rested the decision on the grounds that (1) there
were separate transactions here, and (2) the age of the barred claim
was too great.14 It is possible to infer from the language of the Court
that the compelling reason for the denial of recoupment was that it
would be unwise policy to allow claims over twenty years old to be
asserted in recoupment. 15 In any event, both cases denying recoupment
are frequently cited and are strongly relied upon by the lower courts
and the Commissioner to defeat recoupment even in situations where
the remedy seemingly should be applied.' 6
Recoupment is invariably applied where the fund of money is the
same in the main claim as in the one asserted in recoupment. This
situation occurs most frequently where, as in the principal case, an estate
is diminished by a deficiency income tax assessment after the estate tax
thereon has been paid and suit is brought to recoup the barred estate
tax overpayment against the income tax deficiency payment.' 7 There
must always be some obligation on which the statute has not run against
which the barred estate tax overpayment may be recouped. 18 Both
claims, moreover, must be between the same parties,' 9 except in the
trust situation hereinafter considered. Although there is no case
authority to support such a position, the Commissioner has indicated
that recoupment will not be allowed even where all of these require-
ments are met.20
The trust cases offer an interesting variant in that the parties to the
transaction are not literally the same. Nonetheless, the government in
the Stone case recouped a barred deficiency of the beneficiary against
a recovery by the trustees on the ground that any recovery by the latter
14329 U.S. at 302-03.
McConnell, Recoupment-Dead or Alive, 26 TAXES 1059, 1060 (1948).
18 Rev.. Rul. 226, 1955-1 Cum. BUIL. 469.
', United States v. Herring,, 240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957) ; Dunigan v. United
States, 87 Ct. Cl. 404, 23 F. Supp. 467 (1938). Recoupment was denied in
Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955), and in a case cited
therein, First Natl Bank v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 647 (W.D.S.C. 1954),
because the plaintiff brought suit for a refund of estate tax rather than a
recoupment of an estate tax overpayment against the still open income tax. Contra,
Reeves v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
18 United States v. Frauenthal, 138 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1943) (estate decreased
by an obligation to a party other than the government).
"Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 245 F.2d 524 (9th
Cir. 1957) (court refused to recoup a barred deficiency of a widow's estate against
a claim for refund due the widow's husband's estate, even though the beneficiaries
of each were the same).
"Rev. Rul. 226, 1955-1 Cum. Bu.LL 469.
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would inure automatically to the benefit of the former.2 ' Conversely,
recoupment was not applied to offset a barred deficiency of the trustees
against an overpayment by the beneficiary. 22 Moreover, the settlor is
considered a separate entity from both the trustee and the beneficiary,
thus precluding recoupment.2 3 Although there is an early decision to
the contrary,24 it seems erroneous to consider all relations between the
trust and any other entity a single transaction merely because the trust
involved is the same.
The courts appear very reluctant to grant recoupment where there
has been procedurally inconsistent tax treatment of the same property
as distinguished from essentially inconsistent treatment of the identical
fund of money as in the Bull case. Recoupment has been denied the
government where the taxpayer incorrectly treated the receipt of
property as a gift25 or as incidental to a tax-free reorganization,2 0 thus
avoiding the payment of income tax in the year of receipt and then,
after that year was barred, correctly viewing the receipt transaction so
as to effect a substantial reduction in the capital gains tax due as a
result of subsequent sale. Likewise the government was not allowed
to recoup the income tax due in several barred years of receipt against
a refund of income tax resulting from the incorrect cumulative report-
ing of the income, theretofore unreported, in the current year.2 But
where the Commissioner approved taxpayer's erroneous method of
computing gain from liquidating dividends and subsequently reversed his
earlier decision, thereby causing an income tax overpayment in the now
barred year of receipt and an income tax deficiency in open years, re-
coupment was allowed the taxpayer. 2
8
However, the taxpayer was not allowed to recoup the income tax
he would have saved in a now barred year if he had correctly reported
certain deductions against the additional income tax owed because of a
disallowance of the deduction in an open year,20 even though, in one
21 Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937); First Nat'l Bank v. United States,
12 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ala. 1935).
-"Lyman v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 14 (D. Mass. 1938).
" Silverthau v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 242 (D. Conn. 1938).
2 Lit v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1937). The barred de-
ficiency was a gift tax due on the establishment of the trust and the overpayment
was in connection with an incorrect valuation of a reversionary interest in the
trust which settlor had at his death.
"5 Crawford v. Heiner, 23 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
"' American Light & Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1944);
Rotenberg v. Sheehan, 48 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Mo. 1943), appeal dismissed, 144
F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1944).
27 Grand Central Public Market v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal.
1938), aff'd, 98 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1938).2 Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 78 (M.D.N.Y. 1940).
"Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Longyear Realty Co. v.
Kavanagh, 156 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1946); Hall v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 539,
43 F. Supp. 130, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 664 (1942).
[Vol. 36
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of the cases,30 the Commissioner had refused to allow the deductions
when they were properly put forth. But the government was allowed
to recoup a barred corporate income tax deficiency resulting from the'
taxpayer's deduction in a single year of tooling costs properly de-
preciable over three years against the total overpayments of corporate
income tax which resulted from later assigning the deduction pro-
portionately to the proper years which were still open. 3 1
On one occasion the taxpayer was allowed to recoup barred over-
payments resulting from an erroneously assessed excise tax against open
income tax deficiencies resulting from the refund of that portion of the
excise tax paid and not yet barred.32  In another case the taxpayer was
allowed to recoup an income tax deficiency in open years resulting from
an erroneous allocation of an excess profits tax compromise.33 ' In these
two cases the courts reason that both deficiencies and overpayments are
caused by a single erroneous act, either by the Commissioner or the
taxpayer, and therefore arise out of the same transaction. This ground
for allowing recoupment was not considered in two subsequently de-
cided, widely cited cases.
3 4
Recoupment is an equitable remedy and will be denied if the party
seeking to have it applied is guilty of fraud. 5 Nor may the remedy
be applied by the Tax Court, since its jurisdiction is limited to the
single year under consideration at that time.3 6  Furthermore, Xecoup-
ment will not be granted if there is any other adequate remedy.37 In
this regard it is interesting to note that for twenty years there have been
statutory provisions apparently intended and able to rectify many of
the situations described above, but the courts have not referred to-these
provisions in the later recoupment cases.
38
80 Hall v. United States, supra note 29.
1 Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
" Dixie Margarine Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940).'
" Pond's Extract Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 43, 134 F. Supp. 476 (1955).
" Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946) ; Lynchburg
Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 517, 47 F. Supp. 916 (1942).
"
8J. J. Dix, Inc. v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955); Elberl v.
Johnson, 164 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1947). But see United States v. Herring, 240
F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957), where fraud penalties were assessed.
" Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943).
7 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 245 F.2d 524, 536
(9th Cir. 1957).8 Revenue Act of 1938, § 820, 52 STAT. 581 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 1311-1314), which provides for the suspension of the bar of limitations on a
claim where the party in whose favor the statute has run seeks (1) a double in-
clusion or exclusion of an item in or from gross income, (2) a double allowance or
disallowance of a deduction or credit, (3) the allowance or disallowance of
correlative deductions or inclusions for certain related taxpayers, or (4) a different
determination of basis after the erroneous treatment of a prior transaction. In
the Wells Fargo case, supra note 37, the court stated one of its reasons for denying
recoupment to be the existence of these provisions affording a statutory remedy.
19581
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CONCLUSION
In spite of frequent statements to the contrary, 9 the doctrine of re-
coupment in federal taxation still lives, as evidenced by the many
recent cases which employ it to effect an equitable result seemingly
otherwise unobtainable because of the specific language of the statutes
barring the claim. The taxes must arise out of the same transaction
and the parties in interest must be the same. The longer the period of
time which the transaction covers, the more doubtful is the application
of the doctrine by the courts. If fresh claims could be created by act
of one of the parties in favor of the other to enable the creator to recoup
barred claims, the whole policy of barring claims would be defeated and
no equities demand the application of the remedy.40 Like most other
problems in law, questions such as "What constitutes a single taxable
event or the same transaction ?" and "How long is too long ?" may never
be finally answered but can only be circumscribed by recurring decisions.
JOEL L. FLEISHMAN
Tort Claims Act-Distinction between Nonfeasance and Misfeasance
In Flynn v. State Highway Commn,1 plaintiff's intestate was killed
when the truck in which he was a passenger was wrecked as a result
of its wheel striking a hole in the road, causing its driver to lose con-
trol. In plaintiff's action against the state for negligence in leaving the
road in disrepair, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, which
had affirmed the Industrial Commission, holding that the Tort Claims
Act covers only negligent acts by state employees and not negligent
omissions. In reaching this decision the court stated:
In order to authorize the payment of compensation, the Industrial
Commission's finding must include (1) a negligent act, (2) on
the part of a state employee, (3) while acting in the scope of his
employment, etc. The first requirement is that the claimant
show a negligent act. Is a failure to repair a hole in the high-
way caused by ordinary public travel a negligent act? The re-
quirement of the statute is not met by showing negligence, for
negligence may consist of an act or an omission. Failure to act
is not an act. We think it was the intent of the legislature to
permit recovery only for the negligent acts of its employees, for
the things done by them, not for the things left undone. If the
intent had been otherwise, it would have been easy to permit
recovery for the negligent acts and omissions of State employees.2
" Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1954).
"
0 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Finnegan, 53-1 CCH U.S. TAx CAS. 119299(E.D. Mo. 1953).
1244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).21d. at 620, 94 S.E.2d at 572.
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